National Cyber Warfare Foundation (NCWF)

CVE-2026-12047

Date: 2026-06-11

HTML injection in pgAdmin 4's cloud deployment module. The verify_credentials, deploy, regions, and update-server endpoints under /rds/, /azure/, /google/, and the top-level /cloud/ blueprint propagated AWS / Azure / Google SDK exception text — and the related file-resolution and database-commit exception text — into the JSON response body (the info and errormsg fields) without HTML-encoding. The Cloud Wizard frontend rendered these strings through html-react-parser, so an attacker-influenced exception message embedded structural HTML directly into the wizard's DOM.

The reported entry point is /rds/verify_credentials/. An authenticated pgAdmin user submits a crafted access_key whose value contains an payload; AWS STS rejects the credential with an IncompleteSignature exception whose text quotes the access_key verbatim; the pgAdmin backend forwards that text into the JSON info field; the Cloud Wizard's FormFooterMessage parses it as HTML. The browser fetches the iframe's src from an attacker-controlled host, and JavaScript executing inside the cross-origin iframe writes to parent.location, redirecting the victim's pgAdmin tab. Because the injection renders inside pgAdmin's own interface, X-Frame-Options and Content-Security-Policy frame-ancestors do not mitigate it. Baseline impact is self-targeted (the same user who supplied the payload sees the injection); escalation against other authenticated users requires an additional cross-site request-forgery primitive capable of submitting the malformed credential request with a valid X-pgA-CSRFToken in the victim's browser context.<br><br>The same unsanitised-error-into-JSON pattern was present across multiple sibling endpoints — Azure's check_cluster_name_availability, every Google endpoint that surfaces SDK errors (verification_ack, projects, regions, instance_types, database_versions, the verify_credentials path-resolution branches), the central /deploy endpoint that bubbles str(e) from deploy_on_rds / deploy_on_azure / deploy_on_google, and update_cloud_server which surfaces the str(e) from a failing db.session.commit — all of which are now covered.<br><br>Fix HTML-escapes every external/SDK exception string at the endpoint sink via a new shared sanitize_external_text helper (HTML escape with control-character strip), promoted out of the psycopg3 driver into web/pgadmin/utils/text_sanitize.py. The Cloud Wizard frontend additionally renders its FormFooterMessage in plain-text mode for backend-derived strings, so the value is never parsed as HTML even if a future sink forgets the escape.<br><br>This issue affects pgAdmin 4: from 6.6 before 9.16.</p><br><br><h5>References:</h5><br><ul><li><a href='https://github.com/pgadmin-org/pgadmin4/issues/10069'>issue-tracking</a></li><li><a href='https://github.com/pgadmin-org/pgadmin4/commit/60d149864b5fdd99675754c7996637737a24fce3'>patch</a></li></ul></div><hr><br><table class='table table-striped'><tbody><tr><td><h5>Comments</h5></td><td><a href='post.php?p=fqtIdEj9WB&o=e&c=new' class='btn btn btn-dark' role='button'>new comment</a></td></tr><tr><td>Nobody has commented yet. Will you be the first?</td><tr></tbody></table> <script type='text/javascript' src='nicEdit-latest.js'></script> <script type='text/javascript'> //<![CDATA[ bkLib.onDomLoaded(function() { bkLib.onDomLoaded(nicEditors.allTextAreas); }) //]]> </script> </div></td> <td width="1%"> </td> <td style="padding:10px" width="15%" valign="top" bgcolor="#C0C0C0"> <table class='table'><tr><td><b>Forum</b></td></tr><tr><td><a href='forum.php?f=GuWWnYzsIt'>CVEs</a></td></tr></table></td> </tr> </table> </font> <br><br><hr> <center>Copyright 2012 through 2026 - <a href='https://ncwf.io' target=_blank>National Cyber Warfare Foundation</a> - All rights reserved worldwide.</center> </body> </html>